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This paper analyzes the impact of public investment on the dynamics of private capital 
formation in an intertemporal optimizing market-clearing framework. The key feature 
characterizing the analysis is that the public good is treated as a durable capital good, subject 
to congestion.  We show how in the presence of congestion the effect of government 
investment on private capital formation involves a tradeoff between the degree of substitution 
between private and public capital in production and the degree of congestion.  Both lump-sum 
and distortionary tax financing are considered, with this tradeoff being tightened in the latter 
case. 
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1. Introduction 
The effect of public investment on private capital formation is a crucial public policy issue.  
Empirical research into this question was stimulated by Aschauer (1989a, 1989b) who 
suggested that public capital has a powerful impact on the productivity of private capital.  
Aschauer's results were controversial and have generated substantial empirical research 
directed at determining the robustness of his position.  While the evidence is mixed, there 
seems to be a consensus generally supporting the productivity of public investment, although 
suggesting that its impact is somewhat weaker than that originally proposed by Aschauer. 1  
The theoretical analysis of the productivity of public investment proceeds by introducing 
government expenditure as an argument in the production function, to reflect, among other 
reasons, an externality in production.  Two formulations can be identified.  Most of the existing 
literature treats the current flow of government expenditure as the source of contribution to 
productive capacity.  For example, Aschauer and Greenwood (1985), Aschauer (1988), Barro 
(1989), and Turnovsky and Fisher (1995) do so in a neoclassical Ramsey framework.  Barro 
(1990), and Turnovsky (1995) employ a simple "A-K" endogenous growth model.  While the 
flow specification has the virtue of tractability, it is open to the criticism that insofar as 
productive government expenditures are intended to represent public infrastructure, such as 
roads and education, it is the accumulated stock , rather than the current flow, that is relevant. 
Despite this criticism, few authors have adopted the alternative approach of specifying 
productive government expenditure as a stock.  Arrow and Kurz (1970) were the first authors to 
formulate government expenditure as a form of investment.  More recently, Baxter and King 
(1993) study the macroeconomic implications of increases in the stocks of public goods.  They 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
1See Gramlich (1994) for a comprehensive survey of this empirical literature, most of which is for the 
United States.  Lynde and Richmond (1993) provide evidence suggesting that public capital has 
played an important role in enhancing the productivity growth of UK manufacturing. 
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derive the transitional dynamic responses of output, investment, consumption, employment, 
and interest rates to such policies by calibrating a real business cycle model.  Futagami, 
Morita and Shibata (1993) extend the Barro (1990) A-K growth model to include government 
capital. 
The theoretical model developed in this paper analyzes the impact of the stock  of government 
infrastructure expenditure -- public capital -- on the accumulation of private capital in a Ramsey 
type framework.  A key feature of the analysis is the central role assigned to congestion. The 
few existing models that do introduce public capital, treat it as a pure public good, and thus fail 
to take account of the congestion typically associated with public capital.  Yet, as Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1995) have argued, virtually all public services are characterized by some degree 
of congestion.  Even national defense, sometimes cited as the purest of public goods, is not 
congestion-free.2  These considerations suggest that the incorporation of congestion is an 
important consideration in assessing the relationship between public and private capital 
formation.   
In contrast to the usual specification of congestion in macro models, which is typically to 
normalize aggregate government expenditure by the size of the economy, we introduce a more 
general parameterization, adapting a form of congestion function from the public goods 
literature.3  This is important since our results highlight the existence of an important tradeoff 
between: (i) the degree of congestion and, (ii) the substitutability between public and private 
capital in production, in determining the impact of public investment on the rate of 
accumulation of private capital.   
                                                                                                                                                                                        
2This was originally argued by Thompson (1976). 
3See e.g. Edwards (1990). 
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Two alternative modes of government financing are considered.  The assumption made by Barro 
(1990) and others of a continuously balanced budget in which the only tax is an income tax, 
the (endogenous) revenue of which is spent on productive capital, is restrictive.  It makes the 
economy behave essentially like a centrally planned economy in which the income tax 
provides the mechanism whereby the central planner appropriates the resources from the 
private sector.  Thus, insofar as the resources withdrawn from the private sector are reinvested 
productively by the government, raising the income tax has both a contractionary effect and a 
stimulating effect.  By contrast, the introduction of lump-sum taxation (or equivalently 
government debt) in addition to the distortionary income tax enables the effects of the 
distortionary tax and the expenditure itself to be decoupled, thereby clarifying the respective 
roles played by each in the capital accumulation process.   
2. Macroeconomic Equilibrium with Congestion 
To analyze congestion it is important to distinguish between individual quantities, and the 
corresponding aggregate quantities.  The economy consists of N identical individuals, each of 
whom has an infinite planning horizon, possesses perfect foresight, and faces a perfect capital 
market.  With all agents being identical, all aggregate private quantities are simply multiples of 
individual quantities.  We denote individual quantities by lower case letters and aggregate 
quantities by corresponding upper case letters, so that X = Nx .  We shall express the 
equilibrium dynamics of the economy in terms of the aggregate stocks of private and public 
capital, though care must be used in deriving these equilibrium conditions from the individual 
behavioral relationships. 
The individual agent is endowed with a fixed stock of labor, l .  He is a representative 
consumer-producer and chooses his consumption, c, stock of private capital, k , to maximize 
the following concave intertemporal utility function 
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   max U(c)e-bt
o
¥
ò dt   ¢ U > 0, ¢ ¢ U < 0   (1a) 
subject to the income constraint 
   & ( ) ( , , )k f k l K c k sg
s
k= - - - -1 t d     (1b) 
and initial stock of capital,  
   k(0) = k0        (1c) 
where: t  = distortionary rate of income tax, s = lump-sum taxation, Kg
s  = services obtained 
from the stock of public capital,  b = constant rate of consumer time preference, and dk  = 
constant rate of physical depreciation of private capital, 0 < dk < 1.    
A critical feature of the model concerns the specification of the productive services derived by 
the representative agent from government capital.  These are represented by 
    Kg
s = Kg k K( )1-s 0 £ s £ 1    (2) 
where Kg  denotes aggregate public capital, K  denotes the aggregate private capital stock. In 
particular, (2) implies that in order for the level of public capital services, Kg
s , available to the 
individual firm to remain constant over time, given its individual capital stock, k , the growth rate 
of Kg  must be related to that of K  in accordance with 
& ( ) &K K K Kg g = -1 s  so that s  
parameterizes the degree of congestion associated with the public good.4   The case s = 1 
corresponds to a non-rival, non-excludable public capital good that is available equally to each 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
4The function (2) is the standard specification of the median voter model of congestion; see e.g. 
Edwards (1990).  It implies decreasing marginal congestion provided s < 1.  The specification of 
government services by (2) implies that the use of public capital is congested only by the use of 
private capital.  Other formulations of congestion are also possible; see e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar 
(1994).  For example, public services might be congested by output or employment.  Given that labor 
is supplied inelastically, (2) is a natural specification.  
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firm, independent of the size of the economy; there is no congestion.  There are few examples 
of such pure public goods, so that this case should be treated largely as a benchmark.  At the 
other extreme, if s = 0 , then only if Kg  increases in direct proportion to the aggregate capital 
stock, K , does the level of the public service available to the individual firm remain fixed.  We 
shall refer to this case as being one of proportional congestion, meaning that the congestion 
grows in direct proportion to the size of the economy.5  Road services and infrastructure that 
play a productive role in facilitating the distribution of the firm's output may serve as examples 
of public goods subject to this type of congestion.  In between, 0 < s< 1, describes partial 
congestion, where Kg  can increase at a slower rate than does K  and still maintain a fixed 
level of public services to the firm.6   
Thus, using (2), the individual firm's production function can be written as 
   ( )[ ]y f k l K k Kg= -, , 1 s .     (3) 
Provided the public good is associated with some congestion, (s ¹ 1), aggregate private 
capital is introduced into the production function of the individual firm, generating an externality 
in an analogous way to Romer (1986). 
The production function is assumed to exhibit positive marginal productivity in all three factors, 
f k > 0, f l > 0, f g > 0 , (where to conserve notation we let f g  denote the derivative of the 
production function with respect to the services of public capital).  In addition, we assume that 
the marginal physical product of both private factors are diminishing, f kk < 0, f ll < 0  and that 
there are non-increasing returns to scale in the two private factors, k, l .  Beyond that we shall 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
5In the case s = 0  the good is like a private good in that the median voter receives his proportionate 
share. 
6The case s < 0 can be interpreted as describing an extreme situation in which the services of 
public capital are congested more rapidly than the overall growth of the economy.  See Edwards 
(1990) for evidence supporting this case.  While we do not discuss it, one can easily interpret our 
results in this circumstance. 
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leave open the question of whether the productivity of the public good declines, and whether or 
not the production function is of constant returns to scale in the two private factors [as 
assumed by Turnovsky and Fisher (1995)] or constant returns to scale in all three factors [as 
assumed by Aschauer (1988)]. 
The optimality conditions for this representative agent's problem can be expressed as follows: 
    ¢ U (c) = l      (4a) 
  ( ) ( )
&
1 1
1
- + -
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷æèç
ö
ø÷
é
ë
ê
ê
ù
û
ú
ú
- = -
-
t s d b
l
l
s
f
K
k
k
K
fk
g
g k    (4b) 
where l( t)  is the shadow value corresponding to the budget constraint (1b).  The optimality 
condition (4a) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow value of wealth, while 
(4b) equates the net rate of return on investment in capital to the rate of return on consumption.  
The former, given by the left hand side of (4b) is equal to the after-tax marginal physical product 
of capital, net of depreciation.  In the absence of congestion, the marginal physical product of 
private capital is, as usual, f k .  To the extent that there is congestion, this is augmented by 
the term (1 - s) Kg k( )k K( )1- s f g .  This reflects the fact that an increase in the individual's 
private capital stock, k , given the aggregate stock of capital, K, raises the marginal benefits he 
derives from public capital.  This externality is important in assessing the impact of government 
capital on the behavior of the economy.  The final optimality condition is the transversality 
condition lim
t® ¥
lke-b t = 0, and ensures the intertemporal sustainability of the equilibrium. 
With all agents being identical, aggregate and individual capital stocks are related by K = Nk , 
where N is the number of representative agents (firms).  Thus in equilibrium, the individual 
output, y, and aggregate output, Y = Ny , may be expressed as 
   Y Nf k l K Nf K N l K F K l Kg g g= = º( , , ) ( / , , ) ( , , )y y   (3') 
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where the term y º Ns -1 £ 1, reflects the net effect of congestion.7  Congestion will be 
absent if either N = 1, or s = 1, in which case each agent will receive the full benefits of the 
public good; otherwise they will be scaled down by the factor y £ 1.   
The properties of the aggregate function F mirror those of the individual production function f  In 
particular, the following relationships follow immediately from (3'): 
  Fk = f k;  Fg = Nf g;  Fkk = f kk N;  Fkg = f kg     (3") 
use of which will be made in deriving the equilibrium dynamics.  Since the labor supply is fixed, 
henceforth we shall simplify notation by suppressing it from the production function. 
The government's behavior can now be described.  It is assumed to set an exogenous rate of 
public investment in infrastructure, G, which, starting from an initial stock of public capital, 
Kg ,0 , leads to the accumulation of public capital in accordance with 
  & ; ( ) ,K G K K Kg g g g g= - = >d 0 00     (5a) 
where government capital depreciates at the rate dg  per unit of time.  The government finances 
its investment activities by using either distortionary or lump-sum taxation, in accordance with 
its flow budget constraint: 
   tF(K, Kgy) + S = G       (5b) 
where S denotes aggregate lump-sum taxes.8 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
7For notational convenience we delete N from the aggregate production function, F, and also from the 
aggregate consumption function, C, below. 
8It is straightforward to introduce government debt.  Since the conditions for Ricardian Equivalence 
hold, little is gained by doing so. 
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Aggregating (1b) over the N identical individuals and combining with (5b) yields the aggregate 
economy resource constraint 
   & ( , )K F K K C K Gg k= - - -y d     (6) 
where C º Nc  denotes aggregate consumption. 
This macroeconomic system describes a standard perfect foresight equilibrium.  Through the 
shadow value l  it is forward looking, implying that changes in the steady state induce 
changes in the short run and in the transitional dynamics.  The short-run solution for individual 
consumption, c, derived from (4a), and therefore aggregate consumption, C, is of the form 
   C = Nc = C(l); Cl < 0      (7) 
Substituting (7) into (6') and noting (3'), (3"), (4b), (5a), (5b) the macroeconomic dynamic 
equilibrium is summarized by the following three equations: 
   
& ( ) ( )l l b d t s
y
= + - - + -
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú
ì
í
î
ü
ý
þ
k k
g
gF
K
K
F1 1   (8a) 
   & ( , ) ( )K F K K C K Gg k= - - -y l d     (8b) 
   &K G Kg g g= - d       (8c) 
together with the flow government budget constraint (5d).  
Given the degree of congestion, as parameterized by y , and the scale of the economy, N, the 
system of equations (8a) - (8c) represents an autonomous dynamic system in the two private 
variables, l, K , and the stock of government capital, Kg .  The precise nature of the 
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equilibrium dynamics depends upon how the government chooses to finance its capital 
expenditures.  
Steady-state equilibrium occurs when & & &l = = =K Kg 0  and consists of the following 
relationships (where the tilde denotes steady-state values): 
  (1 - ˜ t ) Fk ( ˜ K , ˜ K g y) + (1- s)
˜ K gy
˜ K 
Fg( ˜ K , ˜ K gy)
é 
ë 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú = b+ dk   (9a) 
   F( ˜ K , ˜ K gy) - C(
˜ l ) - dk ˜ K - G = 0     (9b) 
   dg ˜ K g = G        (9c) 
together with the steady-state government budget constraint 
   ˜ t F( ˜ K , ˜ K gy) + ˜ S = G = dg ˜ K g      (9d) 
The following long-run relationships are implied.  The after-tax marginal physical product of 
private capital, inclusive of the spillover from the productivity of public capital, must equal its 
long-run real rental rate, the latter equaling the sum of the rates of time preference and 
depreciation.  Equation (9b) represents steady-state market clearing, when net investment is 
zero, in which case output must be allocated either to consumption, or to replacing the 
depreciated capital stocks.  Thus equation (9c) asserts that the (gross) steady-state flow of 
government infrastructure investment equals its rate of depreciation.  Equation (9d) requires 
that in steady state that the total tax revenues collected by income and lump-sum taxes must 
equal the sum of government expenditure on depreciation. 
Both the short-run and long-run behavior of the system depends upon the specification of 
government policy and two forms of finance shall be considered. 
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(i) Government Investment Financed using Lump-sum Taxation  
In this case, the distortionary tax rate, t , is fixed exogenously.  Given the fixed rate of 
government investment, G, equation (9c) determines the steady-state stock of government 
capital, ˜ K g .  Having obtained t  and ˜ K g , (9a) determines the steady-state stock of private 
capital, ˜ K , and given the degree of congestion, the level of output.  Equation (9b) determines 
the equilibrium rate of consumption (marginal utility) that ensures steady-state product market 
equilibrium is met.  With output and income tax revenues fixed, the steady-state government 
budget constraint (9d) determines the lump sum tax, ˜ S , necessary to maintain long-run 
government budget balance.   
(ii) Long-Run Government Investment Financed with Distortionary Taxes 
The second example we consider is where the government finances a given increase in its 
investment by a higher distortionary tax, raising the tax rate such that in the long-run, the 
additional tax revenues just finance the additional expenditure: that is 
  F( ˜ K , ˜ K gy)dt + t Fkd
˜ K + Fgyd
˜ K g[ ]= dG     (10) 
Since output is changing along the transitional path, income tax revenues will not precisely 
finance the given increase in public investment.  We assume then that any short-run 
imbalances are financed by a temporary adjustment in lump-sum taxes.  As in case (i), ˜ K g  is 
determined by (9c).  Having determined this, (9a) and (10) jointly determine the required tax 
rate, ˜ t , and the stock of private capital, ˜ K .  Consumption is then determined by the product 
market equilibrium (9b). 
To determine the local dynamic behavior of the economy, we linearize the dynamic system (8) 
about the steady-state equilibrium (9), for set values of G and y .  The linearized dynamics are 
thus described by the following matrix differential equation in l,  K,  and Kg : 
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where: 
  q12 º Fkk + (1 - s)
Kgy
K
Fkg -
Fg
K
é 
ë ê 
ù 
û ú 
;  
 q13 º y Fkg +
(1 - s)
K
Fg + FggKgy[ ] ì í î 
ü ý þ 
 
The determinant of the matrix in (11) is given by 
   D º dgCl
˜ l (1- t)q12 .       (12) 
As usual, the two capital stocks K, Kg  are assumed to evolve sluggishly from their respective 
initial stocks, while the shadow value l  is free to jump instantaneously in response to new 
information.  Thus in order for this dynamic system to be saddlepath stable, there must be two 
stable and one unstable eigenvalues.  Since one eigenvalue equals -dg < 0  the remaining two 
eigenvalues are m1 < 0 and m2 > 0 .  Furthermore, since the product of the three roots equals 
D , it follows that D > 0 , thereby implying the restriction q12 < 0.9 
The degree of congestion is a factor in determining the stability of the system.  In the absence 
of congestion, s = 1, q12 = Fkk < 0, and saddlepoint stability clearly obtains.  In the 
presence of congestion, the condition q12 < 0 is equivalent to the condition that the gross 
marginal product of private capital, inclusive of its effect that operates through the productivity 
of public services, declines.  This condition can be shown to hold if, for example, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
9The eigenvalues are calculated from the characteristic equation of (7), namely 
   ( ) ( )[ ]( ) .m d m q q m q q q q+ - + + - =2 11 22 11 22 12 21 0  
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production function takes a linearly homogeneous CES form, such as that specified in (15) 
below. 10  
3. Dynamic Effects of Public Capital Expenditures 
The formal solution to the linearized dynamic system, (11), is standard; see e.g. Turnovsky 
(1995, Chapter 9).  We shall restrict our discussion of the dynamics to the adjustments of the 
capital stocks, since these are most central to the discussion of congestion.  A brief Appendix 
provides the formal solutions for their time paths.  Having determined these, the time paths of 
output, consumption, and other macroeconomic variables can be derived in a routine manner.  
3.1 Steady-State Effects  
In this section we analyze the impact of a permanent increase in government investment on the 
steady-state equilibrium of the economy, distinguishing between the two methods of financing 
the increase in public investment.   
 (i) Lump-sum Tax Financing 
To determine the long-run effects of a permanent expansion in the rate of government 
investment, financed by lump-sum taxation (or debt), we differentiate the steady-state 
equilibrium conditions (9c) and (9a) with respect to G.  This yields the following responses in 
the aggregate stocks of public and private capital: 
d ˜ K g
dG
= 1
dg
 > 0;
d ˜ K 
dG
= - q13
dgq12
= - y
dgq12
 Fkg +
(1- s)
K
Fg + FggKgy( )é ë 
ù 
û 
 (13a, 13b) 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
10 q12 < 0 will also hold if the services of public capital are multiplicatively separable from the private 
factors of production, i.e. Y = F(K , L)H(Kgy) , and F is homogeneous of degree one in the 
private factors of production, K and L = Nl . 
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A permanent increase in the rate of government investment, G, simply expands long-run public 
capital stock, ˜ K g , by a multiple equal to the inverse of the depreciation rate.  The effect on the 
stock of private capital is of greater interest and depends crucially upon: (i) how the public 
capital interacts with private capital in production, and (ii) the degree of congestion associated 
with public capital.   Suppose first that s = 1 so that there is no congestion.  A larger 
stock of public capital will increase the level of public services, and as long as Fkg > 0 , this 
will raise the marginal physical product of private capital and thereby stimulate the long-run 
accumulation of private capital, ˜ K .  However, in the presence of congestion, a number of 
competing effects are in operation.  As a simple example, suppose initially that the individual 
production function is of the form 
   y = F(k,l ) + aKg
s = F(k,l ) + aKg k K( )
1-s
   (14) 
so that government services enter additively and linearly in the production function.  In this 
case, the level of public services, Kg
s , has no impact on the productivity of private capital, as in 
Aschauer (1988).  But as long as there is congestion (s < 1), the firm has an incentive to 
increase its stock of capital, and thereby increase the level of services it receives from public 
infrastructure.  Thus, for a very different reason from that given above, an increase in public 
investment will lead to a long-run increase in private capital. 
If the level of public services enters nonadditively and nonseparably into production, then both 
mechanisms we have just been describing are in operation.  But to the extent that public 
capital, like private inputs, is subject to diminishing marginal physical productivity, these two 
expansionary effects will be offset by a contractionary effect.  Indeed, if congestion is 
sufficiently severe we cannot rule out the possibility that the negative effect of the declining 
marginal physical productivity of public capital will overwhelm the positive effects described 
above so that an increase in public investment actually reduces the long-run stock of private 
capital.   
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To analyze the interaction between private and public capital further, it is useful to focus on the 
aggregate CES production function: 
   Y = aK- r + bL -r + c(yKg )
-r[ ]- 1 r( )    (15) 
where hº 1 (1 + r)  is the elasticity of substitution.  Evaluating q13  for this function we find 
  ( ) ( )sgn
~
sgn sgn ( ) ( )( )
dK
dG
s sk g
æ
è
ç
ö
ø
÷ = = + - - - -q s s h13 1 1 1   (16) 
where sk º Fk K Y ,  sg º Fg Kgy Y  are the shares (elasticities) of output attributable to 
private capital and to the services of public capital, respectively.11   Rewriting (16) in the form: 
  sgn
d ˜ K 
dG
æ 
è 
ç ö 
ø 
÷ = sgn h+ sk
(1- s)
- (1 - sg)
æ 
è 
ç ö 
ø 
    (16') 
highlights the tradeoff that exists between the degree of congestion and the elasticity of 
substitution in order for government investment to raise the long-run stock of private capital.   In 
the absence of congestion (s= 1) , or if the production function is Cobb-Douglas (h= 1) , (16) 
implies d ˜ K dG > 0.  But if congestion is proportional, (s= 0) , the expansionary effect will 
dominate if and only if the elasticity of substitution exceeds the share of output attributable to 
labor, h> s l .  For a Leontief production function ( h= 0), the expansionary effect will 
dominate if and only if s > sl (1- sg ) .  Thus, with a high degree of congestion, an expansion 
in government investment may quite plausibly crowd out private capital, even if the two types of 
capital are complementary in production, (Fkg > 0) . 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
11Relevant properties of the CES function include: sk + s l + sg = 1, where s l º FlL Y ,  
 Fkk = (1+ r)(sk -1)Fk K ; Fgg = (1+ r)(sg - 1)Fg yKg , Fkg = (1+ r)skFg K  
Combining these with the definitions of q12 ,  q13 , and the definition of h, enables us to derive 
expressions (16), (16'), (16"). 
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Another way to assess how congestion affects the impact of government investment 
expenditure on private capital accumulation is to use (13b) to consider 
d ˜ K dG( )s=1 - d ˜ K dG( )s <1 .  Intuitively, one might expect that government investment will 
have a smaller impact on private capital formation in the presence of congestion.  This may, or 
may not, be the case.  It is straightforward to show that if the production function is of the 
Cobb-Douglas form, then d ˜ K dG( )
s=1
> d ˜ K dG( )
s <1
 implying that congestion does impact 
adversely upon private capital formation.  However, if the production function is of the linear 
additively separable form (14), we find d ˜ K dG( )s=1 < d ˜ K dG( )s <1 and reach the counter-
intuitive proposition that congestion enhances private capital formation.  In the absence of 
congestion, for such a production function, public investment has no impact on the productivity 
of private capital so that d ˜ K dG( )s=1 = 0 .  As discussed above, congestion induces the 
agent to increase his private investment, so as to enhance the services he derives from the 
public investment. 
(ii) Distortionary Tax Financing 
Suppose now that the permanent increase in government investment, G, is financed by a 
distortionary income tax.  From the steady-state equilibrium condition (9c) we see that the 
long-run response of government capital stock, ˜ K g , remains as given by (13a).  From (9a), (9b) 
we can show 
 
¶ ˜ K 
¶G
æ 
è 
ç ö 
ø 
÷ 
Dist
-
¶ ˜ K 
¶G
æ 
è 
ç ö 
ø 
÷ 
Lump -sum
=
¶ ˜ K 
¶t
¶˜ t
¶G
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 
Dist
=
b + dk
q12 (1 - t)
2
¶˜ t
¶G
æ 
è 
ö 
ø 
Dist
   (17) 
Thus we see that a distortionary tax-financed increase in government investment will have a 
less expansionary effect on the long-run private capital stock than a lump-sum tax financed 
increase if and only if the higher public investment requires a higher long-run tax rate, ˜ t , as 
will normally be the case.  Financing using a distortionary tax tightens the tradeoff between the 
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degree of congestion and the elasticity of substitution that is consistent with a positive 
response of private capital.  Analogous to (16') we now obtain: 
 sgn
d ˜ K 
dG
æ 
è 
ç ö 
ø 
÷ 
dist
= sgn h+
sk (1- s) - (1- sg )[ ]
1 - g sg( )sk (1 - s) + sg( )[ ]
æ 
è 
ç 
ö 
ø 
÷    (16") 
where g º G Y = dg Kg Y .  For example, in the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function, 
distortionary tax financing will ensure a positive long-run effect on the private capital stock if 
and only if the share of government capital in production exceeds the long-run claim of 
government investment in output, sg > g . 
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3.2 Transitional Effects 
We now turn to the short-run dynamic responses to a permanent increase in the rate of public 
investment on the transitional behavior of the private capital stock.  For simplicity, we shall 
focus on the case of lump-sum financing and assume that the income tax rate, t , is set to 
zero.  The response of public capital to a permanent increase in G is described by (A.1a).  Its 
behavior is very simple and is illustrated in Fig 1.A.  Following an increase in G, Kg  rises 
along a smooth monotonic path toward its larger long-run value, with the speed of adjustment 
and its steady-state increase being determined solely by the rate of depreciation, dg .  
The transitional behavior of the rate of private investment is of more interest.  To investigate its 
initial response, we evaluate the time derivative of (A.1b) at t = 0, to obtain (with manipulation): 
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  (18) 
where z , defined in (A.2) in the Appendix is shown to have same sign as that of (dg + m1) .  
Assuming that private capital is productive, (Fk > dk)  the coefficient on the term in 
parenthesis in (18) is positive.   Consequently, the initial qualitative response of private 
investment to an increase in public investment depends upon the sign of the term in 
parenthesis.  This represents two offsetting effects and is ambiguous.  First, to the extent that 
q13 > 0 , so that public capital leads to the long-run accumulation of private capital, private 
investment is stimulated in the short run.  The stronger the interaction, the larger the long-run 
response of private capital, and the greater the incentive to invest in the short run, though the 
fact that public capital accumulates slowly initially dampens this positive effect on private 
investment.  The second term in parenthesis, [Fk - (dg + m1)]Fg [Cl
˜ l (1 - t)] , represents 
the direct effects due to the positive marginal physical product of public investment and has a 
negative influence on private investment.  A higher rate of return to public capital, leaving aside 
congestion effects, tends to depress the rate of private investment in the short run, because it 
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leads to an increase in wealth that initially causes the private sector to substitute consumption 
for savings and capital accumulation.  Over time, as the positive output effects of the 
government capital stock come into operation, the expansionary effect dominates and the 
public investment increases the private capital stock, as we have noted. 
Fig. 1.B illustrates the two alternative adjustment paths that the private capital stock may 
follow.  Locus A depicts the case where the capital stock increases monotonically along the 
entire adjustment path, while Locus B illustrates the case where the rate of private investment 
initially falls.  Which of the two cases is more probable is not clear. 12  By contrast, when 
government expenditure impacts on production as a flow -- as in Aschauer (1988) and 
Turnovsky and Fisher (1995)  -- the additional government expenditure has an immediate 
expansionary effect on the rate of private capital accumulation.  This is because the effects of 
the higher flow impact immediately on the productivity of private capital, rather than only 
gradually as the additional public capital stock is accumulated. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The impact of public investment on private capital formation remains one of the important 
issues in macroeconomics.  In this paper we have analyzed the subject in an intertemporal 
optimizing market-clearing framework.  The key feature characterizing our analysis is that we 
have treated the public good as taking the form of a durable capital good, subject to 
congestion.  This view of government expenditure provides a more realistic approach to 
analyzing the intertemporal tradeoffs that public expenditure policy imposes on the private 
sector.  We have also attempted to take seriously the public finance aspects of this question 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
12A similar balancing of expansionary and contractionary short-run responses of private investment is 
discussed by Baxter and King (1993).  Their numerical calibration tends to suggest that only the 
contractionary effect exists when Fkg = 0 .  In our analysis the corresponding condition is q13 = 0 
which reduces to Fkg = 0  in the absence of congestion, s = 1; see the definition of q13  below (11). 
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by considering the choice between lump-sum tax (bond) financing and distortionary tax 
financing.   
Our main focus has been in determining the effect of an unanticipated permanent increase in 
the rate of government investment on the dynamics of private capital formation.  We have 
shown that the effect on the long-run stock of private capital depends upon a number of factors: 
(i) How public capital interacts with private capital in production, (ii) the degree of congestion 
associated with public capital, and (iii) the mode of finance.   
The case of lump-sum financing is treated as a benchmark case.  In the absence of congestion 
a higher stock of public capital will lead to a higher stock of private capital if and only if the two 
factors are complements in production.  In the presence of congestion the effect involves a 
tradeoff between the degree of substitution between private and public capital in production and 
the degree of congestion.  The greater the degree of congestion, the larger must the elasticity 
of substitution be, in order for the private capital stock to increase.  This is certainly met in the 
case of the Cobb-Douglas production function, but if the degree of congestion is large, an 
increase in public investment may ultimately reduce the private capital stock if the elasticity of 
substitution is sufficiently small.  In plausible circumstances, the financing of government 
investment using a distortionary tax will almost certainly be less expansionary than when 
lump-sum tax financing is employed. 
But even if public investment stimulates private capital in the long run, the short-run effects on 
the rate of private investment are unclear, as they depend upon two offsetting effects.  First, to 
the extent that public capital enhances the productivity of private capital, private investment will 
be stimulated in the short run.  But productive public investment also has a negative effect on 
private investment.  This is because it generates an increase in wealth that initially causes the 
private sector to substitute consumption for capital accumulation.  Indeed it is quite possible 
20 — Fisher and Turnovsky / Congestion and Public Capital — I H S 
for this negative effect to dominate suggesting that the short-run crowding out of private capital 
is perfectly plausible. 
While our analysis has focused on the polar cases of lump-sum tax financing and distortionary-
tax financing of government investment, neither of these policies is optimal.  Congestion 
introduces a permanent externality in production that requires the long-run taxation of income 
for its elimination.  Thus it is straightforward to show that the well known Chamley (1986)-Judd 
(1985) proposition asserting that the steady-state tax on capital should be zero applies only in 
the absence of congestion.   
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Appendix:  
Stable Solutions for the Dynamics of Capital Accumulation 
This appendix presents the formal solutions to the linearized dynamic system (11) for the case 
where the government employs lump-sum tax financing (t = 0) ; the case of distortionary tax 
financing is essentially identical.  The solution assumes that K and Kg  starts out from initial 
steady-state values, K0 ,Kg.0 , respectively, so that     
( ˜ K - K0) = - q13 dgq12( )( ˜ K g - Kg,0) ; see (13b). 
Using standard solution methods, the stable time paths followed by Kg ,K ,  and l  are: 
   Kg (t) = ˜ K g + (Kg ,0 - ˜ K g)e
-d gt     (A.1a) 
  K = ˜ K +
dg
zq12
Fk - (dk - dg )[ ]q13 - Fgyq12( ) ˜ K g - Kg ,0( )em1t  
  +
1
z
Fk ydg - Cl
˜ l q13[ ] ˜ K g - Kg,0( )e-d gt    (A.1b) 
l = ˜ l -
˜ l 
zm1
F k - (dk - dg )[ ]q13 - Fgyq12( ) ˜ K g - Kg, 0( )dgem1t + m1e-dg t( ) (A.1c) 
where q12 ,  q13  are defined by equations (11); m1 < 0,-dg < 0 are the stable eigenvalues of 
(11), and 
 z º dg [Fk - (dk - dg )] - Cl
˜ l q12 = (dg + m1)[(Fk - dk ) + (dg - m1)]   (A.2) 
In the second inequality defining z , we have used the fact that m1 , being an eigenvalue, 
satisfies: 
    m1[(Fk - dk ) - m1 ] = -Cl
˜ l q12    (A.3) 
Equations (A.1) provide the basis for the analysis of the dynamic adjustment of the economy in 
response to an increase in the rate of government investment, undertaken in Section 3.  
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